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Abstract 
We theorize the forms of value in the Marxist system in a way that challenges 
the dominant tradition. The standard procedure has been to read Marx’s 
Capital as an analysis that begins at a high level of abstraction and moves 
toward more concrete concepts. Our alternative approach posits that the forms 
of value in the Marxist system evolve from more concrete toward more abstract 
forms of wealth that increasingly separate from and obscure labor exploitation. 
Our procedure therefore replaces the dominant interpretation of ‘successive 
approximations’ employed by most scholars. We develop a broader account of 
Marx’s project alongside textual evidence retrieved from many of his writings. 
We also provide a new way to incorporate the monetary, financial, and rentier 
forms of wealth into Marx’s labor value theory. The proposed alternative 
approach can potentially open a research agenda on the contemporaneous 
dynamics of abstract and concrete forms of wealth in advanced capitalism. 
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1. Introduction 
The standard interpretation of the value system in Capital posits that Marx gradually progressed 
from the most abstract toward the most concrete levels of analysis. It understands Marx’s method 
as a method of ‘successive approximations’ in which the most abstract concepts are successively 
enriched with new concrete determinations. This interpretation became dominant in the Marxian 
tradition and has appeared in the works of major scholars. 
In this article we re-conceptualize the labor theory of value in the Marxist system and 
propose a different understanding of the larger project in Capital in a way that challenges the 
dominant tradition. Our interpretation posits that Marx developed a system of categories that 
evolve from more concrete toward more abstract forms of wealth, which progressively separate 
from and obscure labor exploitation. Our procedure therefore replaces the dominant interpreta-
tion of successive approximations.  
While we grant that Marx progressed from more abstract to more concrete concepts, we 
argue that the dominant interpretation is incorrect because it does not rightfully capture the dia-
lectical method that Marx learned from the Hegelian tradition. The introduction of each new val-
ue form does not negate or replace the concepts that were introduced earlier, but rather incorpo-
rates and reinterprets them. The dominant interpretation is also inadequate since it does not in-
corporate the opposite and complementary progression from more concrete to more abstract 
forms of value. The movement toward more concrete analysis is also a movement toward more 
abstract value forms.  
The term ‘abstract’ has two concurrent but different meanings in Marxian analysis. In the 
standard interpretation, ‘abstract’ refers solely to the distance between the level of analytical ab-
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straction and the concrete complexity of the object of analysis. In our approach, ‘abstract’ also 
refers to the distance between the forms of value and the source of value, namely the exploitation 
of productive labor. Abstract forms of value are forms of value separated from value-producing 
labor by increasing layers of mediation. Even though all value derives from the exploitation of 
productive labor, individual capitalists can still generate new forms of abstract wealth that gradu-
ally separate from and obscure the source of value. 
We present textual evidence to offer a new account of the structure of Marx’s writings 
over the three volumes of Capital and also in his earlier works and drafts, such as the 1861-63 
Theories of Surplus Value, the 1857-58 Grundrisse, and the 1861-63 Economic Manuscripts. In 
our approach we explicitly define and identify the meaning of each concept in the theoretical 
structure. This procedure then allows us to incorporate in a new way the monetary, financial, and 
rentier forms of wealth into the Marxist labor theory of value. Compared to the standard interpre-
tation, we provide a clearer and broader account of the inner connections present in Marx’s chain 
of concepts. 
The relevance of the interpretation that we develop is twofold. First, it allows the Marxi-
an tradition to overcome an inadequate understanding of how the Marxist value system operates. 
Second, it potentially opens a new research agenda on contemporaneous forms of capital valori-
zation that explicitly incorporates the dynamics of abstract wealth in advanced capitalist econo-
mies. 
2. Successive Approximations vs. Autonomization 
Marx’s unique combination of English and German philosophies in the nineteenth century inau-
gurated a long tradition of debates about the proper framework for doing political economy. In 
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the late 1920s Henryk Grossman (1992, p.12) originally developed the idea of ‘approximations 
to reality’ from the abstract to the concrete, an approach later buttressed by the publication of 
Rosdolsky’s 1968 path-breaking The Making of Capital. Grossman’s insight found resonance in 
several major publications thereafter. Maurice Dobb and Paul Sweezy were among its most fer-
vent supporters. For example: 
Marx believed in and practiced what modern theorists have called the method of 
‘successive approximations’, which consists in moving from the more abstract to 
the more concrete in a step-by-step fashion, removing simplifying assumptions at 
successive stages of the investigation so that theory may take account of and ex-
plain an ever wider range of actual phenomena. […] [T]he results achieved in 
Volume 1 … undergo a more or less extensive modification on a lower level of 
abstraction, that is to say, when more aspects of reality are taken into account. 
(Sweezy, 1970, pp.11-18) 
Although widely accepted, the ‘successive approximations’ interpretation is inaccurate. As a 
description of the world, Marx’s analysis moves from highly simplified abstractions to a more 
complex, richly detailed, concrete level of analysis. For Grossman and his followers (among 
whom we find Sweezy, Dobb, Ronald Meek, Böhm-Bawerk, Bortkiewicz, and modern Sraffi-
ans), Marx’s method consists of moving from unrealistic mental constructs toward greater con-
sistency with concrete reality as if, over and over, Marx were making claims that he knew to be 
false. But in no way does Marx correct his supposedly false assumptions as he moves toward 
greater concreteness. Contrary to the idea that “stage by stage, the investigation as a whole draws 
nearer to the complicated appearances of the concrete world and becomes consistent with it” 
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(Grossman, 1992, p.12), Marx never claimed his assertions to be inconsistent with reality at any 
point of his analysis.  
Capital is a work in the Hegelian tradition of systematic dialectics. Each category in the 
system establishes a structure that incorporates the structures of previous categories and is then 
incorporated into the structures of subsequent categories (Smith, 1993, p.155; 1990). Marx’s 
system is therefore constructed as a chain of internal logical relations, a totality in which catego-
ries at different levels of abstraction are meaningful only in their relationship to one another (Ar-
thur, 1996, p.194; 2004). Even though Capital progresses from the more abstract to the more 
concrete, the ‘successive approximations’ interpretation does not correctly capture that progress 
since there is no logical or conceptual motivation for the transitions. 
In addition, as we demonstrate in this paper, at the same time that Marx’s analysis moves 
toward the more concrete, the object of analysis – the forms of wealth – become increasingly 
more abstract, more separated from the generation of value by productive labor. The progression 
in the system toward more abstract forms of wealth is therefore structured in direct opposition to 
the concomitant progression toward higher concreteness of those same analytical categories. The 
double inaccuracy of the standard framework stems, first, from a misunderstanding of the idea of 
levels of abstraction in the Hegelian tradition and, second, from not incorporating the organizing 
principle of concrete and abstract forms of wealth at each of these varying levels of conceptual 
abstraction. 
We define autonomization as the progression of value forms toward higher levels of ab-
straction – and this is the progression of the analysis through the three volumes of Capital. The 
source of all value lies in the exploitation of productive labor. Autonomization then labels the 
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progressive separation of the forms of value from its source through the gradual introduction of 
new layers of mediation between value forms and labor exploitation. Marx himself originally 
employed the German word Verselbstständigung to mean ‘transition to independence’, ‘gaining 
own momentum’, or simply ‘autonomization’. More strikingly, he indicated that capital compris-
es both autonomization and class relations:  
Capital, as self-valorizing value, does not just comprise class relations, a definite 
social character that depends on the existence of labor as wage-labor. It is a 
movement, a circulatory process through different stages ... Hence it can only be 
grasped as a movement, and not as a static thing. Those who consider the auton-
omization [Verselbstständigung] of value as a mere abstraction forget that the 
movement of industrial capital is this abstraction in action. Here value passes 
through different forms, different movements in which it is both preserved and in-
creases, is valorized. (Marx, 1992, p.185 – emphasis added) 
In this very illuminating passage it is possible to note three crucial ideas on the dynamics 
of the forms of wealth: that valorization occurs together with the autonomization of value; that 
the autonomization of value forms is not just a conceptual abstraction but objective abstraction in 
action; and that value passes through different forms across its valorization circuit. 
The term ‘concrete’ originates from the Latin word concretus, the past participle of the 
verb concrescere. ‘Con’ means together, and ‘cretus’ means grown. Thus concrete means 
‘grown together’ or ‘formed by aggregation’. That is what Marx meant when stating in the 1857-
1858 introduction to the Grundrisse that “[t]he concrete is concrete because it is the synthesis of 
multiple determinations, hence unity of diversity” (Marx, 1973, p.101). A concrete object – 
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which need not be tangible – is concrete as long as it is present with all of its particular determi-
nations (color, time, location, smell, texture, usefulness, physical attributes, conceptual attributes 
etc.). The abstract is the opposite of the concrete. From the Latin word abstractus and the verb 
abstrahere, abstract means ‘drawn away’ or ‘separated by force’. The abstract draws away from 
the specificity of the concrete. An abstraction occurs when a certain characteristic of a concrete 
object is isolated from the other determinations. Even though they affect each other, the abstract 
and the concrete co-exist as two differentiable determinations of the same object. 
Drawing from Marx, we employ the term value to designate abstract wealth, and the term 
use-value to designate concrete wealth. Concrete and abstract wealth are not two types of wealth 
but rather the two co-existing determinations of the same wealth produced in capitalism.  Con-
crete wealth is qualitative wealth in its specific and particular aspect; it exists through use-values, 
the particular qualitative usefulness of tangible and intangible goods and services. Abstract 
wealth is quantitative wealth present with only one of its multiple determinations. In capitalism 
one particular quantitative aspect, namely the value of such useful concrete use-values is then 
forcefully isolated (abstracted) from the qualitative aspects. Concrete wealth can then be priced 
and evaluated in monetary terms, implying that concrete wealth becomes evaluated and meas-
ured through abstract wealth. 
Adam Smith ingeniously posited that the source of monetary, or priced wealth is labor. 
Smith was the first to understand that human labor creates not just concrete wealth (particular 
useful use-values) but also abstract wealth (value). He also understood that it was abstract wealth 
that allowed concrete wealth to be measured as well as traded in markets. Even more, Smith 
traced the origin of monetary prices to the values produced by labor. But it was only almost a 
hundred years later with Marx that the origin and magnitudes of monetary profits in capitalism 
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were adequately connected to the values produced by a socially specific form of labor, and not 
just human labor in general. 
Marx then began to theorize the different distributions of surplus-value (industrial profit, 
merchant profit, money-dealing profit, rent, interest, capital gains etc.) while connecting them 
too to value-creating activities. However they differ from one another, all forms of abstract 
wealth, including the contemporary ones such as financial derivatives and higher-order securi-
ties, always share one common aspect: they can be priced and traded. This means they have an 
expression in monetary (and therefore abstract) terms that entitles them to place claims on pro-
duced values. 
Even though only productive labor produces new value, the system in its totality creates 
new and co-existing forms of abstract wealth that gradually separate from and hence obscure the 
source of new value. Compared to the pricing of simple commodities, the pricing of complex 
financial derivatives represents many more layers of mediation in relation to labor exploitation.  
The concept of autonomization, however, does not hypostatize labor exploitation per se 
without the actual mediations that give form to the material production of new value. The crea-
tion of value through the exploitation of productive labor already presupposes the complex forms 
of value that develop in capitalism because the creation of value is always mediated by all of the 
many value forms. As our interpretation of Marx’s theory incorporates forms of value that are 
successively more separated from labor exploitation, it gradually gives a fuller account of the 
actuality of value creation in the capitalist mode of production.  
The proposed concept of autonomization thus makes explicit the paradox of wealth ac-
cumulation in capitalism: from an aggregate perspective surplus-value expansion depends on 
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labor exploitation, yet individual capitalists maintain the ability to produce financial and non-
financial revenues in ways that increasingly obscure both labor exploitation and the creation of 
surplus value.  
3. The Marxist System: Logic vs. History 
The logical analysis derives the forms of wealth in a progression from the commodity form to 
more and more abstract forms. The drive toward increasing autonomization has its origin in the 
double determination of wealth produced in capitalism as concrete and abstract wealth (or as use-
value and value). Because capital progressively subjugates use-value to value, the system will 
gradually favor the abstract generality to the detriment of the concrete particularities. The 
contradiction that begins as the paradoxical relationship inherent to the commodity form between 
value and use-value then unfolds into more complex and developed forms such as rent-bearing 
capital, interest-bearing capital and fictitious capital – the term Marx employed to conceptualize 
the creation and pricing of financial assets. Capital therefore develops different contradictions at 
different levels of abstraction.  
 Marx’s method consists of showing that capital can never solve its contradictions. Capital 
displaces its contradictions to higher and more generalized levels when attempting to solve them 
(Fausto, 1997, 1987a, 1987b; Paulani, 2011; Dussel, 2001; Harvey, 2010, 2006). 
Autonomization takes place as capital resolves its contradictions at one level of abstraction only 
by displacing the contradictions to a higher level, gradually adding new mediations and hence 
separating the forms of abstract wealth from the source of value. Autonomization is not a mere 
subjective movement that the thinking mind undertakes but rather the objective development of 
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the forms of value within capitalism. The more that capital develops concretely the more 
abstractions it creates. 
 History proceeded differently. Marx wrote Capital in a logical, not historical order. The 
components of the analysis exist simultaneously in fully developed capitalism, but history 
introduced those components in an order different from the order of Marx’s exposition. Money, 
usury capital, and fictitious capital chronologically preceded the spreading of the commodity 
form; but they do not precede commodities in the logical presentation. Marx is clear about this 
point: 
It would therefore be unfeasible and wrong to let the economic categories follow 
one another in the same sequence as that in which they were historically decisive. 
Their sequence is determined, rather, by their relation to one another in modern 
bourgeois society, which is precisely the opposite of that which seems to be their 
natural order or which corresponds to historical development. (Marx, 1973, p.107) 
 We can synthesize capital’s conceptual formation as a chain of abstractions. Each value 
form is a further step in the progressive autonomization of abstract wealth from labor 
exploitation: money is autonomized value; capital is autonomized money; profit is autonomized 
surplus value; interest-bearing capital, rent-bearing capital, and fictitious capital are forms of 
autonomized capital. Money, capital, rent-bearing capital, interest-bearing capital and fictitious 
capital are all higher forms of autonomization: 
[T]hese different parts of surplus-value acquire an independent form, because 
they accrue to different people, because the titles to them are based on different 
elements, and finally because of the autonomy with which certain of these parts of 
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surplus-value confront the production process as its conditions.  From parts into 
which value can be divided, they become independent elements 
which constitute value. (Marx, 1971, p.927 – emphasis added) 
The higher the stage of autonomization the greater are the layers of mediation that sepa-
rate the form of value from its source. However many layers of mediation intervene, autonomiza-
tion is never complete. No single form of value can acquire complete independence from the 
other forms in the system or from the exploitation of labor. 
4. Stages of Autonomization: Re-Conceptualizing the System of Value Forms 
In this section we develop our re-conceptualization of Marx’s broader project. We explicitly 
demonstrate how a novel interpretation of his writings reveals capital as expanding value that 
gradually separates from and obscures the sources of value creation. We divide the stages of au-
tonomization into three conceptual phases: (a) autonomization of value from use-value, or the 
constitution of money; (b) autonomization of money from commodity circulation, or the consti-
tution of capital; (c) autonomization of capital from labor exploitation, or the constitution of un-
productive activities. 
4.1 Autonomization of Value from Use-Value: The Constitution of Money 
Marx proceeds stepwise in his system of chained abstractions. The starting point of 
autonomization is the commodity form, as presented in the very first chapter of Capital I. The 
commodity form is the starting point as it is the conceptual, or logical stem cell of the 
contradictions of the other value forms in the system. We employ the term contradiction, as 
Marx did, to indicate a relation whose elements are concomitantly complementary and opposite. 
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 The contradictions of capital find their initial logical source in the relationship between 
the two constituents of the commodity form: value and use-value. The origin of the relation 
between value and use-value lies in the differentiation between abstract and concrete labors, 
itself a differentiation created by the historical opposition between privatized relations of 
production (private ownership) and socialized forces of production (social reproduction). The 
double determination of the commodity as value and use-value is a key aspect of the formation 
of capital and of its initial autonomization.  
 Use-value is created by concrete labor. Whether commodities are tangible or not, goods 
or services, their use-values are the particular qualitative bases for values in capitalism. Without 
use-value, production and consumption could not expand; accumulation cannot proceed if what 
is being produced is not useful. Value, on the contrary, is created by abstract labor. It is the 
general quantitative dimension whose quantum is determined by the labor time socially 
necessary to reproduce the commodities. Determined by social conditions of production and 
consumption, value is inherently a relational property. In the commodity, value and use-value are 
at the same time both complementary and antagonistic dimensions to each other. They are 
complementary because concrete and abstract labors are not two kinds of labor but rather the two 
inseparable and co-existing determinations of the same commodity-producing labor; and 
antagonistic because while value refers to the social generality, use-value refers to the concrete 
particularity. In capitalism two contradictory measures are in play: the heterogeneous measure of 
concrete usefulness and the homogeneous measure of abstract labor time. 
The commodity therefore experiences an inherent problem: it is a privately produced 
good or service that only acquires ex post validation socially when exchanged for other commod-
ities or for money. The particular commodity needs to be socially accepted by the market: a 
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commodity’s particular use-value cannot be a particular use-value unless it becomes a social 
value through trading. Vice-versa, the value embodied in the commodity cannot be realized in 
the market if the commodity is not a useful use-value for private individuals.  
The market cannot solve the contradiction that constitutes the commodity form. When a 
commodity is exchanged, the other circulating commodities also face the same paradox: one’s 
value finds its validity in another’s use-value. The relation between value and use-value is the 
contradiction between the social form and its own material basis, and it is also the very first logi-
cal source of endogenous capitalist business cycles. Social validation occurs a posteriori, after 
commodities are produced. If market validation does not occur the individual capitalist faces a 
problem. If non-validation becomes systemic then capitalism faces a crisis with increasing piles 
of unsold inventories.  
Marx gets to this point of the analysis without yet introducing money, so he is still con-
ceptually referring to barter exchanges. But a barter-based market cannot overcome the contra-
diction that constitutes the commodity form. Money then finds its logical place. In a very illumi-
nating passage on the conceptual emergence of money, the principle of autonomization starts to 
take shape: 
Money necessarily crystallizes out of the process of exchange, in which different 
products of labor are in fact equated with each other, and thus converted into 
commodities. The historical broadening and deepening of the phenomenon of ex-
change develops the opposition between use-value and value which is latent in the 
nature of the commodity. The need to give an external expression to this opposi-
tion for the purposes of commercial intercourse produces the drive towards an in-
dependent form of value, which neither finds rest nor peace until an independent 
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form has been achieved by the differentiation of commodities into commodities 
and money. (Marx, 1990, p.181 – emphasis added)  
 The independent form of value that Marx refers to is money. Money is a relational 
property that becomes itself an external object, a thing – a social relationship that takes the 
particular independent form of grains, salt, gold, silver etc. The abstract character of wealth 
(value) becomes something objective that confronts the particularities (use-values) from which it 
emerged: 
But in what way are gold and silver distinguished from other forms of wealth? 
Not by magnitude, for this is determined by the amount of labor embodied in 
them. But rather as autonomous embodiments and expressions of the social char-
acter of wealth. This social existence that it has thus appears as something be-
yond, as a thing, object or commodity outside and alongside the real elements of 
social wealth. … [T]he social form of wealth exists alongside wealth itself as a 
thing. (Marx, 1994, pp.707-708 – emphasis added) 
 Marx is hence drawing a crucial distinction between value, exchange-value, and money. 
Value is the social character of labor in capitalism, whose magnitude is measured through the 
amount of labor time socially necessary to reproduce a commodity. Exchange-value is the 
relation between values of different commodities in exchange, or simply value-in-exchange, 
measured as the exchange ratio between the values of at least two commodities. In exchange-
value, the absolute values of different commodities are expressed relatively through their 
exchange ratios. Money is the social character of labor (i.e. value) presented as a thing, even 
though not necessarily tangible or physical. Money is objectified value. In money, value itself 
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exists autonomously as an external object. Exchange-value is the ratio between values in 
exchange, but unlike money it is not yet an independent being, a thing. Exchange-value is a pure 
relation that still does not constitute a thing in itself. Money, on the other hand, is a social 
relationship that presents itself as an independent object. Money is value incarnated in an object. 
Money is autonomized value.1 
 The money form emerges when value completes its autonomization by becoming a pure 
formal use-value: a commodity whose use-value is its social ability to be an independent form of 
value. In its conceptual origin, money is autonomized value that now stands astride the 
multifarious world of commodities as the general equivalent. The logical origin of the money 
form, not its historical origin, lies therefore in the increasing independence of value from 
particular use-values.2 Money, this autonomous representative of value, owes its existence to the 
separation of abstract from concrete wealth: 
The product becomes a commodity; the commodity becomes exchange value; the 
exchange value of the commodity is its immanent money-property; this, its mon-
ey-property, separates itself from it in the form of money, and achieves a general 
social existence separated from all particular commodities and their natural mode 
of existence (Marx, 1973, pp.146-147). 
It is the foundation of capitalist production that money confronts commodities as 
an autonomous form of value, or that exchange-value must obtain an autonomous 
form in money (Marx, 1994, pp.648-649 – emphasis added).  
Money is objectified social labor – abstract wealth that has been autonomized from the 
concrete particularities of any single commodity. While commodities circulate because of their 
[14] 
 
individual and specific use-values, money circulates because it is “the abstract-autonomous form 
of exchange value or of general wealth” (Marx, 1973, p.345). Marx clearly relates the concept of 
money to the objectification of abstract wealth: 
Money is the independent existence of exchange value. Viewed from the angle of 
its quality, it is the material representative of abstract wealth, the material exist-
ence of abstract wealth. To make money by means of money is the purpose of the 
capitalist production process — the increase of wealth in its general form, of the 
quantity of objectified social labor which is, as this labor, expressed in money. 
Whether the existing values figure merely as money of account in the ledger, or in 
whatever other form, as tokens of value, etc., is initially a matter of indifference. 
Money appears here only as the form of independent value (Marx 1988, p.99 – 
emphasis added). 
 The contradiction between value and use-value cannot be solved, for in capitalism the 
market validates production only ex post. Money allows production and consumption to be more 
flexible through time and space, helping traders cope with the difficulty of producing 
commodities requiring ex post market validation. But in doing so, money displaces the 
contradiction to a higher and more generalized level. Monetary crises can then occur 
independently of productive crises exactly because a relational property (value) exists as a thing 
(money) external to those same relations from which it is derived: 
As long as the social character of labor appears as the monetary existence of the 
commodity and hence as a thing outside actual production, monetary crises, 
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independent of real crises or as an intensification of them, are unavoidable (Marx, 
1994, p.649 – emphasis in the original). 
 The conceptual origin of money lies therefore in the autonomization of value from use-
values. The next step is to understand how money, in turn, faces its own autonomization.  
4.2 Autonomization of Money from Commodity Circulation: The Constitution of 
Capital 
Marx developed a unique and powerful monetary theory, unfortunately widely misread even by 
Marxists. Our approach, influenced by the works of Fausto (1997, 1987a, 1987b), Paulani 
(2011), Dussel (2001) and Rosdolsky (1989), draws attention to the important conceptual 
distinction between “money as coin” (or “money as currency”) and “money as money”. This 
distinction is crucial to understanding the contradiction of money. Money has four 
determinations. First, it is a measure of the value of commodities and thus a standard for prices. 
Second, it is a means of exchange of commodities. Third, it is a means of hoarding (store of 
value). Fourth, it is a means of payment (commercial credit). The first two determinations 
(measure of value and means of circulation) constitute what Marx called “money as coin” or 
“money as currency” while the last two determinations (money as hoarding and means of 
payment) constitute what Marx called “money as money”. 
 Money as coin, or money as currency, is money that provides the common measure for 
commodity values, provides a standard for prices, and facilitates circulation. It does so as a 
simple intermediary: its circuit is C–M–C. Money (M) lies in the middle while the objective of 
the circuit is to trade different commodities (C). Even though autonomized value, money is here 
only a passive link connecting the desires of buyers and sellers of concrete use-values.  
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 Money as coin already allows for the first autonomization of money, for it enables 
valueless symbols to displace commodity currencies as means of circulation. The more that 
capitalism develops, the more we observe how the money form increasingly attempts to get rid 
of any material vestige when it operates as means of circulation. The money form of value can 
increasingly detach (even though not absolutely) from the tangible matters – like gold, silver, 
grains, and salt – that might come to bear it. The exclusive use of commodity currencies like 
gold and silver constrains the circulation of means of exchange to be proportional to 
commodities’ values. But with the introduction of non-commodity currency the circulation of 
means of exchange becomes more independent from the values of the produced commodities. 
Non-commodity currencies do not circulate as embodied values, as is the case with gold and 
silver. The direct connection between the supply and value of the currency, on one side, and the 
values of the produced commodities, on the other, fades away through the de-materialization of 
the means of exchange. As non-commodity currency — paper currency, electronic currency, 
plastic debit cards, bitcoins, or simply dots on a computer screen — value is represented by mere 
valueless symbols of itself. Even when replaced by valueless symbols of itself, money is never 
valueless. By definition, money is objectified value: 
The fact that money can, in certain functions, be replaced by mere symbols of 
itself, gave rise to that other mistaken notion, that it is itself a mere symbol (Marx, 
1990, p.185). 
 It is an error therefore to speak either of “valueless money,” “commodity money,” or 
“non-commodity money.” As our framework demonstrates, money is never a commodity: money 
is money, a category distinct from the concept of commodity. A currency can be a commodity or 
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not — hence the correct language is to speak of “commodity currency” and “non-commodity 
currency” as we did in the above paragraphs.  
 Money as money, contrary to money as coin or currency, is no longer a mere 
intermediary that facilitates trade. It becomes instead the end of circulation. As hoarding (store of 
value) and as means of payment (commercial credit), money has a new circuit: M–C–M. It starts 
and closes the circuit. Commodities become instead intermediaries in the process of money 
circulation. Money as money therefore does the opposite of money as coin. Money as money and 
money as coin contradict each other; they are concomitantly complementary and opposite. 
Money is contradictory because it is at the same time the intermediary and the end of the 
circulation circuit. It is an object with two opposing circuits occurring juxtaposed: 
Money in its third quality, as something which autonomously arises out of and 
stands against circulation, therefore still negates its character as coin. […] Money 
is the negation of the medium of circulation as such, of the coin. But it also 
contains the latter at the same time as an aspect, negatively, since it can always be 
transformed into coin (Marx, 1973, pp.226-228). 
 The crucial point is that of money becoming an end in itself: “Instead of being merely a 
way of mediating the metabolic process, this change of form becomes an end in itself” (Marx, 
1990, p.228). The passage from the C–M–C to the M–C–M circuit constitutes the second 
autonomization of money. More logical mediations now separate money circulation from 
commodity circulation; more logical mediations thus separate the circulation of values from the 
circulation of use-values. Partially independent of consumption and production conditions, 
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money starts to develop its own autonomized circuit. Not the use-values of commodities but 
money itself becomes the objective of value circulation: 
[M]oney, the independent form of exchange-value, is the starting-point, and the 
increase of exchange-value the independent purpose. Commodity exchange itself, 
and the operations that mediate it — separated from production and performed by 
non-producers — becomes simply a means of increasing wealth, and not just 
wealth, but wealth in its general social form as exchange-value (Marx, 1994, 
p.443). 
 Autonomization proceeds even further with monetary forms. In the money as money cir-
cuit, M–C–M, the money trader is trading money for money without making a profit, a meaning-
less exchange in capitalism. The circuit of money then becomes M–C–M’, in which money deal-
ers profit (M’ minus M) from their activities. M–C–M’ is precisely what Marx calls the circuit of 
capital. The circuit of capital springs conceptually from the circuit of money as money. When 
money becomes the end of circulation it then paves the way for the origin of capital, of “autono-
mous exchange value (money) as a process” (Marx, 1973, p.305). 
In the conceptual discourse, capital emerges out of the contradictions of money. Marx 
states clearly that the circuit of capital, or of ‘dynamic value’ is a higher stage of autonomization 
because this form of value is more detached from use-values. The positing of money as an end in 
itself allows abstract wealth to become the aim of circulation, and concrete wealth to take on a 
subordinate role. With the capital form, the circulation of use-values becomes merely a support 
of the system of value circulation: 
[19] 
 
[Capital] is not only an independent expression of value as in money, but dynamic 
value, value which maintains itself in a process in which use-values pass through 
the most varied forms. Thus in capital the independent existence of value is raised 
to a higher power than in money (Marx, 1989, p.318 – emphasis added). 
 We have here uncovered capital’s logical origin in the autonomization of money.3 It is 
then necessary to theorize the contradictions that constitute the capital form and how capital 
faces its own specific autonomization.   
4.3 Autonomization of Capital from Labor Exploitation: The Constitution of Un-
productive Activities 
The money-as-money circuit, M-C-M, is senseless if it cannot be converted into the circuit of 
capital, M-C-M’ with M’ greater than M. This can happen only if labor power is available in 
commodity form. Labor power is the sui generis commodity that has the use-value of creating 
more value for its buyer. The value that labor power then creates beyond its own is defined as 
surplus value. 
 When capital matches with the doubly-free labor force it develops its full monetary 
circuit: M–C…P…C’–M’. The …P… phase represents production, extraction of surplus value, 
or simply labor exploitation. The production of new use-values (C’) is subjugated to the 
objective of making more money (M’) out of money (M). As any other use-value, labor power 
will also be subjugated to the expansion of value, hence M and M’ represent respectively the 
beginning and the purpose of the circuit. Both production and labor exploitation appear as 
intermediaries in the general process of value expansion: 
[20] 
 
[I]t is the exchange-value, not the use-value, that is the decisive inherent purpose 
of the movement. It is precisely because the money form of value is its 
independent and palpable form of appearance that the circulation for M…M’, 
which starts and finishes with actual money, expresses money-making, the driving 
motive of capitalist production, most palpably. The production process appears 
simply as an unavoidable middle term, a necessary evil for the purpose of money-
making. (This explains why all nations characterized by the capitalist mode of 
production are periodically seized by fits of giddiness in which they try to 
accomplish the money-making without the mediation of the production process). 
(Marx, 1992, p.137) 
The first autonomization of capital occurs with the transformation of surplus value into 
gross profit. The concept of surplus value still maintains visible its direct connection with the 
labor component of capital. But once surplus value is presented as gross profit and hence as the 
compensation for the total capital invested, including both of its labor (variable) and non-labor 
(constant) components, the origin of surplus is further obscured: 
[T]he relation between surplus value and the variable part of capital is an organic 
one. In fact it expresses the secret of the formation and growth, of the existence of 
capital as capital. This organic relation is extinguished in the relation between 
profit and capital. Surplus value obtains a form in which the secret of its origin is 
no longer hinted at with the slightest trace. Since all parts of capital equally ap-
pear as the basis of the newly created value, the capital-relation becomes a com-
plete mystification. (Marx, 1991, p. 70 – emphasis added) 
[21] 
 
“[S]urplus-value denies its own origin in this, its transformed form, which is prof-
it; it loses its character and becomes unrecognizable. (Marx, 1994, p.267 – em-
phasis added) 
The second autonomization of capital then occurs with the distributions of gross profit. 
Prior to the conceptual emergence of surplus value in the chain of abstractions, autonomization 
took place only in the sphere of circulation. After the proper logical constitution of productive 
capital and the effective existence of surplus value, Marx formally introduced the distinction 
between productive activities (that generate surplus value) and unproductive activities (that claim 
a share of the surplus value generated in productive activities). He was then able to theorize how 
capitals engaged in unproductive activities, such as commercial capital and money-dealing capi-
tal, develop their own circuits and thus autonomize themselves from productive activities: 
In commercial and money-dealing capital, rather, the distinctions between indus-
trial capital as productive capital and the same capital in the sphere of circulation 
attain autonomy in the following way: the specific forms and functions that capital 
temporarily assumes in the latter case come to appear as independent forms and 
functions of a part of the capital that has separated off and become completely 
confined to this sphere. (Marx, 1994, p.440 – emphasis added) 
The activities (not actually ‘spheres’ as Marx put it) that claim a share of surplus value 
become gradually independent from the activities that generate surplus value, even though the 
creation of value is the pre-condition for its consumption. The autonomization process thus con-
tinues with the separation of unproductive activities from the source of new value in productive 
activities: 
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Despite the autonomy it has acquired, the movement of commercial capital is 
never anything more than the movement of industrial capital within the circula-
tion sphere. But by virtue of this autonomy, its movement is within certain limits 
independent of the reproduction process and its barriers, and hence it also drives 
this process beyond its own barriers. This inner dependence in combination with 
external autonomy drives commercial capital to a point where the inner connec-
tion is forcibly re-established by way of a crisis. (Marx, 1994, p.419 – emphasis 
added)  
The same reasoning of ‘inner dependence’ combined with ‘external autonomy’ applies to 
money-dealing capital, for it takes over part of the productive capital as its own specific and in-
dependent movement: a “definite part of the total capital now separates off and becomes auton-
omous in the form of money capital … in the course of its reproduction process” (Marx, 1994, 
p.431 – emphasis added). 
 Among the vast array of unproductive activities that capitalists can engage in, Marx gives 
special attention to three of them. The first type of unproductive activity employs interest-
bearing capital, comprising all those activities that claim a share of surplus value through interest 
payments. Interest payments occur whenever the owners of money or production inputs lend 
their resources to other parties. Interest is the payment for any borrowed sum of value, be it in 
money or commodity form. The second type of unproductive activity employs rent-bearing 
capital, comprising all those activities that claim a share of surplus value through rent payments. 
Rent payments occur whenever a party has to pay a sum of money to the owners of monopolized 
resources not reproducible by human labor – such as land, oil, licensed knowledge, and patented 
information. Rent is the payment for the use only, not for the transfer of ownership, of any 
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monopolized resource not reproducible by labor. The third and last type of unproductive activity 
employs fictitious capital, comprising those activities that claim a share of surplus value through 
the creation, pricing, and trading of financial assets. The formation of a fictitious capital occurs 
whenever a security or financial asset is created – such as stocks, debt bonds, insurances, and 
derivatives. We now turn to each of these three types of unproductive activities in more detail. 
Interest-bearing capital emerges when any sum of value is lent, entitling the owner of the 
advanced sum of value to receive interest payments from the borrower. Marx distinguishes two 
cases. The first is when the sum of lent value is in monetary form, as in the advancement of cred-
it. In this case, interest-bearing capital exists whenever money itself is bought and sold in credit 
markets. However, it is only the use-value of money that is transferred, not its ownership, and 
interest is the payment for this use-value of money. Interest-bearing capital is then money with 
the use-value of having a claim on more value. The second case happens when the lent sum of 
value takes the form of commodities, as when a capitalist borrows productive inputs such as ma-
chines or other forms of fixed capital from another capitalist. The borrower then pays back inter-
est to the original owner of the inputs. Once again, what gets transferred is the right of use, not 
the right of ownership. Both lent money and lent inputs share in common the feature that they are 
lent sums of value: 
[M]oney – taken here as the independent expression of a sum of value, whether 
this actually exists in money or in commodities – can be transformed into capital. 
(Marx, 1994, p.459)  
The full circuit of interest-bearing capital then becomes M–M–C…P…C’–M’–M’, but to 
the owner of money it is just M–M’. Autonomization has thus made an additional step as the 
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unproductive M–M’ circuit represents an extra level of separation of capital from the productive 
or surplus value-producing circuit M–C…P…C’–M’. More layers of mediation now separate 
interest from the source of value, even though all interest payments are deductions from the total 
surplus value produced:  
All that we are concerned with here is the independent form of interest-bearing 
capital and the way that interest acquires autonomy vis-à-vis profit. (Marx, 1994, 
p.480) The general question of how gross profit is differentiated into interest and 
profit of enterprise comes down simply to the question of how a part of the gross 
profit is invariably ossified and autonomized as interest. (p.499 – emphasis 
added)  
 The specific external autonomy of interest payments for individual capitalists in the 
M…M’ circuit confronts the general internal dependence of all capitalists together in relation to 
the existing surplus value, since the “autonomization of the two parts of gross profit, as if they 
derived from two separate sources, must now be fixed for the entire capitalist class and the total 
capital” (Marx, 1994, p.498 – emphasis added). Even more, interest-bearing capital, to be 
considered as such, does not necessarily have to be directed toward productive activities. Even 
though interest payments are a deduction from the total surplus value generated in the economy, 
interest can be charged from any stream of income, be it from workers’ wages, non-financial 
corporations’ profits, or from the government budget.  
 The crucial aspect is that interest as a form of abstract wealth introduces a new layer of 
mediation in relation to the exploitation of productive labor: 
[25] 
 
The division of profit into profit of enterprise and interest (not to speak of the 
intervention of commercial profit and money-dealing profit, which are founded in 
the circulation sphere and seem to derive entirely from this, and not from the 
production process itself at all) completes the autonomization of the form of 
surplus-value, the ossification of its form as against its substance ... One portion 
of profit, in contrast to the other, separates itself completely from the capital 
relation as such and presents itself as deriving not from the function of exploiting 
wage-labor […] [P]rofit still retains a memory of its origin which in interest is not 
simply obliterated but actually placed in a form diametrically opposed to this 
origin. (Marx, 1994, p.968 – emphasis added) 
 An analogous interpretation applies to the rent-bearing capital form (Marx, 1994, p.806-
817). Rents accrue to the owners of resources not reproducible by labor, therefore valueless, such 
as urban and rural land, patented information, and licensed knowledge (Teixeira and Rotta, 
2012). Unlike interest, rents appear when valueless resources are traded, leased, or licensed. But 
like interest, rents accruing to unproductive activities represent a deduction from the total surplus 
value generated in the economy. Rent then bears extra layers of mediation in relation to 
productive activities: 
If ... capital comes up against an alien power that it can overcome only partly or 
not at all, a power which restricts its investment in particular spheres of 
production, allowing this only under conditions that completely or partially 
exclude that general equalization of surplus-value to give the average profit, it is 
clear that in these spheres of production a surplus profit will arise, … this being 
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transformed into rent and as such becoming autonomous vis-à-vis profit. (Marx, 
1994, p.896 – emphasis added) 
Autonomization finally reaches its most advanced stage with the formation of fictitious 
capital. Marx introduced the concept of fictitious value at the end of Capital III to demonstrate 
how the creation, pricing, and trading of financial assets represent a new level of separation of 
abstract wealth that obscures even more the source of surplus value. The trading of securities, 
debt bonds, stocks, derivatives, and financial assets in general introduce more layers of media-
tion between the forms of value and the productive activities generating new value. When main-
stream economists suspect that ‘asset prices do not reflect the fundamentals of the system’ 
(Shiller, 2005) they are noticing fictitious accumulation. 
What characterizes fictitious values is the capitalization of future streams of income: 
“The formation of a fictitious capital is called capitalization” (Marx, 1994, p.597). The capitali-
zation of value applies to any financial asset whose market price is influenced by expectations of 
and speculations on future profitability, which implies that even interest- and rent-bearing capi-
tals can potentially become fictitious capital.  
Marx understood that the price of assets was not determined in the same way as the price 
of commodities. Market prices for goods and services fluctuate around production prices, but no 
such gravitational mechanism exists for the prices of assets. The price of tradable securities and 
derivative contracts, for example, is determined in secondary markets quite independently of the 
productive activities from which they get their share of surplus value. Decades before Keynes 
and then Minsky wrote about the two-price system, Marx anticipated their contributions: 
[27] 
 
The independent movement of the value of these titles of ownership, not only of 
government bonds but also of stocks, adds weight to the illusion that they consti-
tute real capital alongside of the capital or claim to which they may have title. For 
they become commodities, whose price has its own characteristic movements and 
is established in its own way. Their market-value is determined differently from 
their nominal value, without any change in the value (even though the expansion 
may change) of the actual capital. (Marx, 1994, p.598 – emphasis added) 
 The high degree of autonomization enables fictitious capital to avoid the limitations that 
interest- and rent-bearing capitals have. The extra layers of mediation that it introduces in 
relation to labor exploitation allow movements in asset prices to generate fictitious profits — 
incomes derived from capital gains and financial trading margins — merely based on market re-
pricing effects and speculations about future conditions for surplus value creation. Even though 
Marx never used the term ‘fictitious profits’ in his writings, we employ it to refer to the profits 
derived from trading fictitious capital.  
 The fictitious form of capital thus closes the logical system that began with the 
commodity form. In the beginning of the chain of abstractions, value was closely tied to its 
source. But the development of the distinct forms of abstract wealth in capitalism increasingly 
contributed to autonomize them from the creation of new value. In interest-bearing capital, rent-
bearing capital, and fictitious capital the independent existence of the forms of value is raised to 
an even higher power than in productive capital. With fictitious values, capital and its 
unproductive activities achieve the highest level of separation — even though not a complete one 
— from surplus value generation and labor exploitation in productive activities: 
[28] 
 
[T]he form of mutual alienation and ossification of the various portions of sur-
plus-value is complete, the inner connection definitively torn asunder and its 
source completely buried, precisely through the assertion of their autonomy vis-à-
vis each other by the various relations of production which are bound up with the 
different material elements of the production process. (Marx, 1994, p.968 – em-
phasis added) 
 During any period of time all incomes from any type of individual activity, productive or 
not, relate to an aggregate flow of surplus value. This is the inner connection among all forms of 
abstract wealth. But these same forms of abstract wealth progressively autonomize from the 
production of surplus value and also autonomize from the production and circulation of concrete 
wealth in commodities. Capital, now as the paradoxical totality of productive and unproductive 
activities, therefore depends on and also contradictorily tries to acquire independence from labor 
exploitation. With each new stage of value autonomization, new crisis potentials arise precisely 
because each autonomization still remains constrained by the actual production of new value. 
Periodic crises forcefully realign incomes in unproductive activities with the surplus value 
generated in productive activities and impose a limit on the autonomization of value forms. 
5. Conclusion and Implications 
The standard and long-standing ‘successive approximations’ interpretation of Marx’s labor value 
theory is inaccurate. It incorrectly understands the dialectical movement from more abstract 
toward more concrete analysis as if it were a simple progression from unrealistic toward more 
realistic assumptions. It additionally neglects the substantial effort that Marx made to theorize 
capitalism as an economic system that produces ever more autonomized forms of value. The 
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categories in Capital progress from a high level of abstraction toward a higher level of 
concreteness and complexity at the same time that the forms of value that those same categories 
represent perform the opposite progression. The most concrete and complex concepts are also the 
most abstract value forms, which increasingly separate from and obscure the source of value in 
labor exploitation.  
 Our approach locates the origin of autonomization in the double determination of wealth 
in the commodity form (as value and use-value) and in the progressive subjugation of use-values 
to the forms of value. Our approach thus offers a new way to incorporate financial and rentier 
forms of accumulation into the labor theory of value. This broadened labor value theory can then 
provide a unique account of the co-existence and interaction of different forms of wealth at 
different levels of abstraction. The autonomization perspective presents an alternate 
understanding of the co-evolution of these value forms while also offering a framework in which 
the dynamics of concrete and abstract wealth are explicitly incorporated.  
 Our re-reading of the Marxist value theory potentially opens up a new research agenda on 
contemporaneous forms of capital valorization, for the present stage of capitalism might have 
demonstrated that “individuals are now ruled by abstractions, whereas earlier they depended on 
one another” (Marx, 1973, p.164). It opens the possibility of investigating new interactions 
between concrete and abstract forms of wealth, possibly on the most recent innovations in 
financial instruments and business practices. Our approach also opens the possibility for 
investigating the existence of autonomization crises, a case in which an economic crisis derives 
from excessive levels of value autonomization. It is part of our future research agenda to find a 
quantifiable index of autonomization and to check how this autonomization index correlates with 
business cycles. 
[30] 
 
 The exegetical approach here undertaken elucidates that Marx’s original project was 
larger than what Marxists have hitherto understood. Our framework and proposed re-reading of 
his writings thus bring a novel perspective to the existing scholarship by demonstrating how 
autonomization is a crucial concept in the labor theory of value. The shift from the usual theory 
of successive approximations toward the theory of autonomization allows us to theorize new 
forms of wealth creation and distribution that cannot be understood through the standard 
approach.  
 
Footnotes 
1. In this regard we are in disagreement with Martha Campbell (2004), who posits that exchange-
value and money are identical and therefore can be used as synonyms. For Campbell, Marx 
means money by exchange-value from the beginning of Capital I. However, Marx does not state 
that immediately – she claims – because he wants to develop the category of money dialectically. 
Contrary to Campbell, in Capital I Marx drew a clear distinction between value, exchange-value, 
and money. Note that in the Grundrisse Marx states that “the exchange value of the commodity 
is its immanent money-property; this, its money-property separates itself from it in the form of 
money” (Marx, 1973, pp.146-147). Marx says that exchange-value is the “money-property”, not 
money as such. In any case, we are in agreement with Campbell when she correctly claims that 
the transition from barter to money in Capital I is a conceptual, not a historical transition. 
2. David Graeber’s (2011) recent book-length contribution and also Keith Hart’s (1986) article 
on the hybrid existence of money have challenged the idea that money has historically evolved 
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from barter to commodity currency and then credit relations. Still, they agree that money has 
always been a hybrid entity that takes on aspects of both object and social relation.  This latter 
acknowledgement is what matters to us in this paper, namely that money is at the same time an 
external object and a social relation. Their historical findings indeed corroborate Marx’s concept 
of money. 
3. Our argument in favor of a dialectical transition from the money form to the capital form is 
not accepted by Alfredo Saad-Filho (2002, p.13-14). Saad-Filho argues that Marx does not de-
rive the concept of capital from the concept of money, but instead only contrasts their different 
circuits. In what we see a productive negation between money and capital, Saad-Filho observes a 
mere relation of difference. The argument in favor of a dialectical transition (productive nega-
tion) from money to capital does not imply, as Saad-Filho suggests, that these categories are self-
enacting subjects. On the contrary, it simply means that Marx’s Capital was written in a logical, 
not historical discourse, with no implication that history should follow purely logical impera-
tives. 
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